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INTRODUCTION 
Within the practice of clinical psychology, the 
focus on early memories generally assumes that earliest 
childhood recollections are significant not so much as 
objective information on social history but as 
constructions of experience that reflect aspects of the 
individual's view of self, others, and the world. As 
such, early memories are utilized in both therapy 
(Binder & Smokler, 1980) and diagnostic assessment 
(Langs, 1965). Clinical theory postulates that the 
early memory is an analog of personality structure, that 
the phenomenological aspects of early memories represent 
the individual's characteristic modes of thinking, 
feeling, and interacting. These memories, as 
reconstructions of actual events, are a function of the 
teller's contemporary concerns and adaptations. Even 
among clinicians who do not consider themselves 
particularly psychodynamic in orientation, this 
structural theory is widely accepted. 
This clinical perspective can be traced to Alfred 
Adler who brought the analysis of early memories to 
prominence (1937). Adler believed that early 
1 
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recollections were of the utmost importance to 
understanding an individual's characteristic "style of 
life". He argued that, although one's earliest memory 
is consciously held or easily brought to awareness, 
clinical findings had demonstrated an unconscious 
"purposiveness" in the choice of the memory that has 
been remembered longest. Moreover, Adler postulated 
that memories were at least partially reconstructed so 
that "what is altered or imagined is also expressive of 
the patient's goal" or life-plan. He wrote that: 
When rightly understood in relation to the rest of 
an individual's life, his early recollections are 
found always to have a bearing on the central 
interests of that person's life ..... They are most 
helpful in revealing what one regards as values to 
be aimed for and what one senses as dangers to be 
avoided. They help us to see the kind of world 
which a particular person feels he is living in, and 
the ways he early found of meeting that world. 
(1937, p. 287) 
This perspective was extended to psychopathology, 
whereby the causes of symptomatology were viewed as 
rooted in the individual's beliefs, attitudes, and 
strivings (1937). Implied in this theory is the idea 
that the early recollections are both a measure of 
personality-- the themes, attitudes, and roles being 
relatively stable or consistent over long periods of 
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time-- and reflective of more immediate manifestations 
of distress or concern for the individual. Therefore, 
there is some ambiguity in Adler's view as to how 
sensitive the recall of early memories is to "state" 
factors. His overall emphasis, however, is clearly 
placed upon the stable "traits" of the individual which 
are revealed by the memories. 
Mayman's theoretical perspective (1968) has also 
had a strong impact on the manner in which many 
diagnosticians and psychotherapists conceptualize early 
memories. His model grew out of the ego psychology 
orientation to understanding personality. Similar to 
Adler, he purports that early memories represent 
character structure. He stated: 
Early memories are not autobiographical truths, nor 
even "memories" in the strictest sense of this term, 
but largely retrospective inventions developed to 
express psychological truths rather than objective 
truths about a person's life; .... early memories are 
expressions of important fantasies around which a 
person's character-structure is organized; .... early 
memories are selected (unconsciously) by a person to 
conform with and confirm ingrained images of himself 
and others ..... Consequently, one may sift through 
the stories a person tells about himself and ex-
tract those intrusive interpersonal themes which 
define that person's enduring view of himself and 
his enduring expectations of others. (1968, p. 304) 
Unlike Adler, however, Mayman's theory reflects a 
Freudian influence in its emphasis on the different ego 
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and need states indicated by the memories, 
conceptualized in psychosexual terms. That is, Mayman 
tended to identify "oral", "anal", "phallic", and 
"genital" self and object representations 
memories of his clients (1968). 
in the 
Nevertheless, Mayman' s general statements about 
early memories often seem to epitomize the more eclectic 
clinical theory, since he stresses that early 
recollections are not only "peculiarly self-
representative", but are also "surprisingly limited in 
number and stable in composition" (Mayman & Faris, 1960, 
p. 508). His attitude echoes the pervasive view that 
early memories, and perceptions of self and others in 
general, are stable or constant. 
More recently, a "cognitive-perceptual model" for 
understanding early memories as projective phenomena has 
been proposed by Bruhn and his colleagues (Bruhn, 1981; 
Bruhn & Bellow, 1984; Bruhn & Davidow, 1983; Bruhn & 
Last, 1982; Bruhn & Schiffman, 1982). This model, as 
those outlined above, emphasizes the constructive rather 
than eidetic nature of memory, based on Bartlett's 
(1932) research in perception which supports the notion 
that literal and precise remembering rarely occurs. 
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Bruhn believes perception as well as memory is. 
subject to a selection process which is directed by 
various attitudes, needs, fears, and interests of the 
perceiver. He postulates that a "perception-memory-
perception feedback loop" operates (1982), so that these 
variables will tend to remain constant. It then takes a 
novel and relatively significant event to challenge and 
redirect this perceptual loop. Bruhn points out that 
this may also be referred to as an individual's frame of 
reference; the concept seems analogous to the notion of 
cognitive/affective schemata, as well. 
In regard to more specific memory mechanisms, 
Bruhn suggests that early memories usually 
contain an element of unfinished business. That is, 
the individual's goal has been blocked, so that a 
tension to complete the action permeates the recol-
lection. Thus, many EMs illustrate an issue that 
has not been resolved or one that was resolved only 
after a prolonged struggle. (1985, p. 118) 
Bruhn' s model implies that early recollections 
have a consistent and stable flavor. On the other hand, 
Bruhn's concept of novel experiences impinging upon the 
"feedback loop" provides for the possibility of changes 
in early memories over a short period of time. 
However, neither he nor his colleagues have elaborated 
upon this issue. Al though the theory does allow for 
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early memory change to occur in this manner, there is no 
discussion as to how remarkable and unusual an 
experience must be to produce a change. Nor does Bruhn 
attempt to delineate specific influences that might 
facilitate this change, such as the atypical or extreme 
mood states which can result from a novel experience. 
Overall, Bruhn emphasizes the stability of early 
childhood recollections. 
There is very little empirical evidence to 
support or contradict these popular clinical 
conceptualizations of early memories, despite their 
pervasiveness. Though the literature on this approach 
tends to be well articulated in various respects, there 
is a lack of clarity about the nature and causes of 
structural personality change and 
manifestations or by-products, 
recollections. Specifically, the 
the effect on its 
such as early 
issue has not been 
addressed regarding the possibility of natural variation 
in an individual's perceptions of self, other, and world 
(i.e., object relations), which would then be apparent 
in the individual's early recollections. It is unclear 
as to how much variation is expected in early memories 
as a function of the plasticity of certain underlying 
7 
"person" variables. 
To date, there has been little research exploring 
the degree to which early memories might change over 
time, as a function of either mood, situation, or 
intervening life events. However, Hedvig (1963) studied 
the effects of experimentally manipulated experiences 
for one occasion per subject on both early memory 
descriptions and Thematic Apperception Test (TAT) 
stories. A group of college students (N=360) was given 
anagram puzzles to solve. The specific experimental 
conditions of this task differed with respect to degree 
of difficulty (leading to either success or failure 
experiences), and degree of friendliness of hostility 
exhibited by the experimenter. Hedvig explored whether 
the affective tone and thematic content of earliest 
recollections and TAT stories correlated with the 
emotions and themes assumed to be generated by the 
different experimental conditions. She found that the 
affective tone and thematic content of the TAT stories 
more often matched the subjects' experienc~s than did 
the early memory narratives. Based on this comparison, 
Hedvig concluded that earliest recollections are 
generally stable and likely to reveal "permanent 
8 
personality characteristics". 
There are a number of methodological weaknesses 
in this study that limit its implications with regard to 
understanding early memories. It does not provide 
temporal stability data, but only compares early 
recollections 
addition, no 
experimental 
to another projective device. 
check was made to verify that 
conditions had in fact elicited 
In 
the 
the 
emotions the author intended to elicit. Therefore, 
Hedvig's conclusions about the significance of earliest 
recollections are not adequately demonstrated in this 
investigation. 
Another study, in the realm of treatment outcome 
research, has indirectly addressed the question of early 
memory stability (Ryan & Bell, 1984). This 
investigation assumes that structure is subject to 
change under extraordinary circumstances, and that 
these changes will carry over and be revealed through 
differences in the memory of early childhood events. 
In other words, structural change is assumed to occur 
through effective psychotherapy and early memories are 
treated as the dependent variable or evidence of that 
change. 
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These authors studied treatment outcome among. 
inpatients diagnosed as schizophrenic by evaluating 
their apparent 
operationalized 
change in object 
object relations 
relations. 
as the 
They 
scores 
associated with each subject's reported early memories 
as assessed through the Ryan Object Relations Scale 
(Ryan, 1973). Progress in therapy was hypothesized to 
be reflected in corresponding changes in memory scores 
from test one (intake), to test two (9 months into 
treatment), to test three (termination of treatment), to 
test four (6 month follow up). Again, inherent in this 
methodology is the assumption that object relations are 
reflected in early memories, and that these 
representations of self and others may be plastic, or 
subject to observable degrees of change under certain 
circumstances, such as psychotherapy. 
The researchers found that there was a fair 
amount of change in the memories elicited, namely the 
individuals' earliest memory, earliest memory of mother, 
and earliest memory of father. 
significant increases in the 
In general, 
scored 1eve1 
there were 
of object 
relations from admission to discharge and follow-up for 
the group studied. 
10 
In response to these results, Ryan and Bell 
commented that "the increase in object relations scores 
challenges the theoretical view that low levels of 
object relations is a relatively fixed characteristic of 
schizophrenia." They see their findings as providing 
empirical data which contradict the commonly held 
beliefs about object relations stability. For our 
purposes, it is important to note both of the 
implications of these results. First, object relations 
may not be as static as often conceptualized in the 
literature. Second, in regard to ear 1 y memory 
stability, in so far as early memories reflect internal 
object relations, so too will these memories, or aspects 
of them, be subject to change. 
Ryan and Bell indicate that the notion of 
instability in object relations and, consequently, in 
childhood recollections is not usually emphasized in the 
relevant scholarly literature. As mentioned above, 
theorists such as Adler tend to be vague as to how 
easily changed they might be or what forces (other than 
psychotherapy) might contribute to fluctuations. 
Overall, Ryan and Bell argue the following: 
The explicit or implicit suggestion in much of this 
work is that object relations patterns are set down 
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in early childhood, become consolidated through ~ate 
childhood and early adolescence, and remain rela-
tively fixed throughout adult life as the transfer-
ence paradigms of character. Adult functioning 
whether normal, neurotic or psychotic is assumed to 
be dependent on the maturity of one's object rela-
tions, that is, on the relatively stable level one 
has achieved along the developmental continuum. 
From this point of view, improvement in object 
relations is possible only as a result of a muta-
tive maturational process, apparently limited to 
natural developmental processes and/or psycho-
therapy. (1984, p.210) 
This is a clear articulation of pervasive 
clinical theory which excludes short-term variables as 
having an effect on object representations and 
manifestations thereof, namely early memories. There is 
no empirical evidence to support this claim or, more 
fundamentally, the idea that early memory narratives in 
general are highly stable. In fact, Winthrop's study 
(1958) on repeat reliability of written descriptions of 
earliest memories found that 32% of the reported 
memories for 69 subjects were unreliable upon an eight 
week retest. Unfortunately, his investigation provides 
only global conclusions about the percentages of 
memories where changes, omissions, or additions 
occurred. He does not describe the kinds or degrees of 
alterations found, nor does he comment on the 
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qualitative significance or clinical implications of his 
data. 
Plutchik, Platman, and Fieve (1970) examined the 
stability of early recollections among a sample of 
manic-depressive patients. Subjects gave their three 
earliest memories on two different occasions, an average 
of seven weeks apart . Using a technique developed by 
Wynne and Schaffzin (1965) for assessing emotional 
content, the three earliest memories of each subject 
were rated with respect to eight basic emotions. 
Correlations were obtained in order to test the 
stability of these memories over time. The authors 
found that the average affect scores were fairly 
constant (total affect~ =.71). However, specific types 
of affect, particularly those of a dysphoric nature, 
were much more variable over the retest period. 
Plutchik and his colleagues reported that the 
stability of recalled affect in individuals is only 
moderate or low for most affects, but feelings of 
anger and total affect are highly stable in the 
repeated recalls~ (1970, p. 180) 
They concluded that either the overall content of the 
early memories must have changed for many subjects upon 
retest, or that the wording of their memories was 
13 
substantially modified. The authors also noted that the 
manic-depressive patients seemed to show less total 
affect and positive affect in their earliest 
recollections than had been previously reported for 
college students (Wynne & Schaffzin, 1965). 
Thus, Plutchik, Platman, and Fieve found that 
early recollections were less stable than would be 
expected by traditional clinical theories. Their 
clinical results indicate that the common 
conceptualizations of early memories may put too much 
emphasis on their use as a stable index of personality. 
The data imply that, although a few affective aspects of 
earliest recollections are relatively stable, enough 
variation occurs to justify conceiving of early memories 
as a more state-related index of emotional functioning. 
Unfortunately, the study by Plutchik and his colleagues 
is weak in certain important respects, limiting its 
generalizability. The authors 
early memory descriptions that 
elaborate scoring 
besides emotional 
or analyses. 
content were 
collected 
did not 
very brief 
allow more 
No other variables 
coded, such as those 
related more specifically to perceptions of self and 
other people. 
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Recent research in other areas of psychology a~so 
seems to refute the idea that memories remain stable 
over short periods of time and regardless of immediate 
mood or circumstance. Much of the research conducted in 
regard to memory and its various influences, such as 
affect, takes place in the realms of cognitive and 
experimental psychology. Such research differs from 
clinical outcome research in both its purpose and 
perspective for investigating early memories. Many of 
these studies are laboratory investigations that use 
mood induction techniques for exploring the relationship 
between emotion and recall, rather than examining their 
pre-existing or naturally occurring relationship. These 
findings provide overwhelming support for the notion 
that the memories which are more easily retrieved, the 
details included, and the attributions about these 
events are shaped to a great extent by fluctuations in 
current mood state (Blaney, 1986). In other words, 
factors related to the individual's immediate situation 
or mood may influence the way earliest recollections are 
selected and described. 
For instance, Teasdale and Fogarty (1979) used a 
mood induction procedure to examine the differential 
15 
effects of depressed and happy moods on recall of 
pleasant and unpleasant events. They used a procedure 
similar to the Velten technique where subjects were 
presented with a series of self-referent statements 
intended to produce the desired mood state. Subjects 
were seen on two separate occasions, receiving the 
depressed mood induction at one meeting and the elated 
or happy mood at the other. Upon achieving the intended 
mood, subjects were then presented with a list of words 
and asked to recall a past life event, either pleasant 
or unpleasant, which they associated with each of the 
given words. Subjects later rated their own memories 
for degree of pleasantness and unpleasantness as did 
independent judges. Results showed that the two induced 
mood states differed significantly in terms of latency 
of retrieval; that is, 
time to retrieve pleasant memories, relative to time 
time to retrieve unpleasant memories, was signifi-
cantly longer when subjects were depressed than when 
they were happy. (1979, p. 248) 
The authors concluded that their study suggests a 
differential effect of mood on the accessibility of 
these two types of memories. 
A more complete study by Teasdale, Taylor, and 
16 
Fogarty ( 1980) examined the effects of induced elated 
and depressed moods on recall of happy and unhappy 
experiences. Using again the Velten procedure, they 
elicited the two moods on different occasions and had 
subjects make ratings, as above, on a third occasion in 
a "neutral" mood state. The researchers found that 
extremely unhappy memories were significantly more 
likely to be retrieved in the depressed mood than in 
the elated mood. Extremely happy memories were 
significantly more likely to be retrieved in the 
elat~d mood than in the depressed mood. (p. 339) 
Latency effects were reported as significantly 
different, also in the manner above. These results, 
therefore, add support to the notion of "mood congruent 
effects" on retrieval and recall of affectively charged 
memories. 
Casas (1985) replicated mood congruent retrieval 
effects with earliest memories rather than the "past 
life events" usually focused upon in this area of the 
literature. He correlated five reported earliest 
recollections with subjects' reported mood states. 
Using a circumplex model of emotions, Casas demonstrated 
that: 
1. happy subjects recalled a larger proportion of 
number of happy memories than did sad subjects; 
2. sad subjects reported more 
recollections than happy subjects did; 
sad 
17 
ea_rly 
3. for subjects scoring as extremely happy or sad, 
there was a higher intra-subject proportion of memories 
recalled that were congruent with their reported state 
mood. 
This study, while it does not examine temporal 
stability of early memories, provides strong evidence 
that earliest recollections covary with affect, just as 
more contemporary types of recal 1 have been shown to 
correlate with mood. There is a large body of 
literature demonstrating mood influences on varying 
memory tasks. In Blaney's review of the literature on 
affect and memory (1986), he cites numerous studies that 
confirm the presence of "mood congruence" effects, as 
well as providing evidence for the "state dependent 
learning hypothesis" to explain facilitation of recall. 
Taken together, these studies may be viewed as lending 
credence to the hypothesis that the description of one's 
earliest memory (and perhaps the choice of that memory) 
is influenced to some degree by temporary variations in 
mood. What is noticeably lacking in this area of 
research, however, is exploration of the effects of 
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naturally-occurring mood on repeated recollections of 
events, and early memories in particular. 
An integration of clinical theory and empirical 
findings would propose that early memories are a 
function of the individual's cognitive-perceptual view 
or nature of his/her object representations, but that 
those perceptions are fairly plastic. In other words, 
the structural aspects of mental representations or 
cognitive/affective schemata might vary over a range or 
continuum for any given individual. While there might 
be a prototypical stance for the individual in a neutral 
mood state, it is possible that naturally occurring mood 
changes can cause cognitions and perceptions to shift, 
so that the same event or memory might be differentially 
interpreted or re-experienced by the individual under 
different moods. Also plausible is the idea that the 
choice of the particular memory might change as a result 
of mood shifts, in that the accompanying affect would 
facilitate the retrieval of certain memories as opposed 
to others. Thus, the degree of pleasantness/ 
unpleasantness, the perceptions and attributions about 
self, others, and the environment, and perhaps even the 
thematic eon tent of early memories could, in 
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relationship to mood fluctuations which impinge on the 
underlying structure of object relations, show 
variation. This is an integrative hypothesis for which 
there is no direct empirical evidence. The following 
exploratory study examined the stability of earliest 
memories in relationship to naturally occurring mood 
changes over an eight to twelve week period, in order to 
assess the validity of such a hypothesis. 
change. 
change 
Specifically, these predictions were made: 
1. Early memory change in association with mood 
In general, there would be some degree of mood 
among subjects which would be correlated with 
changes in early memory scores. 
2. Total amount of early memory change. The sum 
of all the early memory variables that received a 
different rating at administration two, would be 
positively related to mood state changes. Thus, the 
magnitude of change in early memories would covary with 
magnitude of mood change, whether these affective shifts 
were in a positive or negative direction. 
3. Pleasantness of content. Early memories 
would be construed as more pleasant by both subjects and 
judges as mood improved. Conversely, the self-reported 
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memories would be rated as more unpleasant by subj~cts 
and judges as mood became more negative. 
4. Object relations. Object relations variables 
would change in relationship to mood such that: 
a. View of others. Other people would be 
described by subjects in a more positive light (e.g., 
tending to satisfy rather than frustrate needs) as mood 
improved. Others would be perceived by subjects as more 
negative, tending to be "need frustrators" or even 
completely dissociated from memory events as mood 
worsened. 
b. View of self. Subjects' views of themselves 
within their memories would become more positive (more 
active and successful) as mood improved, while their 
self perceptions would become more negative as mood 
worsened. 
c. View of environment. The environment would 
be seen as more supportive and safe as subjects' mood 
became more positive, and the opposite would be true 
for subjects whose mood became more negative. 
d. Individual distinctiveness. Other persons 
would be described in more distinctive and elaborate 
terms as mood improved. When mood worsened, other 
21 
persons would be less well defined, more vague and 
unclear. 
e. Interpersonal contact. 
interpersonal contact would tend 
improved, with less interaction 
worsened. 
A greater degree of 
to occur as mood 
occurring as mood 
f. Total. The sum score of the object relations 
aspects would similarly covary with mood. 
g. Level. In the EM scoring system used here, 
the total object relations score was categorized into 
four levels. These levels were hypothesized to bear a 
relationship to mood such that improved mood would 
correlate with a higher level score. 
also expected. 
The converse was 
5. Givingness. Subjects whose mood was better 
at test two were hypothesized to have more positive 
themes of giving and receiving care from others, 
especially in adult-child interactions. Such positive 
thematic content included affection, attention, support, 
and protection. Subjects whose mood becomes more 
negative will have less givingness and more experiences 
of care deprivation in their early memories. 
6. Mastery. Subjects whose mood improved would 
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have more successful and positive mastery experiences in 
their memories. The converse would be true for those 
whose mood worsened. 
7. Mutuality. Subjects whose mood improved 
would have more positive and cooperative sibling and 
peer interactions. The opposite trend was hypothesized 
to occur for those whose mood worsened. 
8. Damage. Subjects whose mood improved would 
describe less damage to themselves, others, animals, and 
inanimate objects in their memories. Those whose mood 
worsened would describe greater damage. 
9. Relation to reality. The overall degree of 
clarity, coherence, and logic of the reported events in 
the early memories would be greater as mood elevated and 
less as mood worsened. 
The following study examined these hypothesized 
relationships between mood and earliest childhood 
recollections in order to clarify the meaning of early 
memories with respect to the competing theories 
described above. The focus upon these ear 1 y memory 
variables was chosen so that the temporal stability of 
earliest childhood recollections and mood influences 
upon their descriptions might be ascertained. 
METHOD 
Subjects 
Fifty-two undergraduates, 35 females and 17 
males, attending a Catholic university in a large 
midwestern city were recruited from psychology courses. 
Each subject received 2 credits for their participation 
as part of a departmental option which allows for a 
limited number of extra credit points to be awarded to 
students who participate in psychological experiments. 
Subjects ranged in age from 17 to 22 with a mean 
age of 19.7 years. They were of diverse racial 
background: 55.77% white, 19.23% black, 11.54% Hispanic, 
7.7% Asian, and 5.77% of unknown origin. 
The subject attrition rate between administra-
tions was 18.75% or 12 of the original 64 subjects who 
completed the first half of the procedure. In the 
majority of cases, attrition was due to students having 
withdrawn from their respective psychology courses at 
some point during the 8-12 (mean of 10.0) week retest 
interval. 
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Materials 
Profile of Mood States (POMSl 
This self-administered questionnaire (McNair, 
Lorr, & Droppleman, 1971) was designed to sample the 
contemporary affective state of the individual. The 
subject was presented with a list of 65 possible moods, 
and instructed to indicate (on a five-point Likert 
scale) to what degree he/she has or has not experienced 
each feeling "during the past week including today". 
(See Appendix A.) Thus, this instrument provided 
information regarding moods that are short-term but not 
momentary. Scores were tallied by summing respondents' 
total responses for each of the six following factors: 
Tension-Anxiety, Depression-Dejection, Anger-Hostility, 
Vigor-Activity, Fatigue-Inertia, Confusion-Bewilderment. 
A seventh factor, Total Mood Disturbance, was calculated 
by subtracting subjects' scores for Vigor-Activity from 
the sum of the other five scales. The raw score for 
each factor was converted to T scores, according to 
norms provided in the manual. 
Multiple Affect Adjective Check List Revised (MAACL-R} 
The trait version of the MAACL-R (Zuckerman & 
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Lubin, 1967) measures moods that respondents consider to 
be typical of themselves. This self-administered 
instrument directs subjects to endorse i terns that are 
descriptive of how they "generally feel" by checking off 
from a list of 132 mood-related adjectives the i terns 
that apply to themselves. (See Appendix B.) The 
adjectives presented load on the following scales: 
Anger, Depression, 
Sensation Seeking. 
Hostility, Positive Affect, and 
Separate scores for each of these 
factors were calculated by adding the relevant i terns 
checked by the respondent. A sixth factor, Dysphoria, 
was obtained by adding the subject's scores for anger, 
depression and hostility. T score conversions were made 
according to norms for each raw score obtained. 
Early Memory Questionnaire (EMQ) 
This survey, a modified version of the instrument 
used by Mayman (1968), contains written instructions 
requiring subjects to "think back to the earliest memory 
you have of a specific happening or event from your 
childhood .... " and to describe that event in as much 
detail as possible. To enable scoring, an inquiry was 
conducted regarding the aspect of the memory that was 
• 
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clearest and the strongest feeling that is associ~ted 
with the memory. (See Appendix C. ) Data provided by 
this instrument was of a written narrative nature, 
requiring use of a coding system to categorize and 
quantify the information obtained. In this study, a 
modified version of The Comprehensive Early Memory 
Scoring System (Last & Bruhn, 1983) was utilized. 
Procedure 
Subjects attended two 
approximately 40 minutes each. 
sessions lasting 
Informed consent was 
obtained, and subjects were asked to complete the two 
affect measures with reminders to read the instructions 
for each carefully. Next they completed the Early 
Memory Questionnaire. Subjects returned 8-12 weeks 
later (mean retest interval was 10.0 weeks) to complete 
the second half of the experiment. For this retest, 
subjects were given exactly the same instruments and 
instructions as above. 
The memories were coded according to a modified 
version of The Comprehensive Early Memory Scoring System 
developed by Last and Bruhn (1983). A summary of the 
scoring system is presented in Appendix D. This system 
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includes separate ratings of object relations, thematic 
content, and degrees of damage, realisticness, and 
pleasantness or unpleasantness of the memories (see 
hypotheses) . Specifically, the scoring system was 
organized as follows: 
1. Total Change was the number of early memory 
variables that differed from test one to test two. Each 
changed variable was worth one point. However, if the 
respondent gave a completely different memory event at 
the retest, this change in early memory content was 
weighted at five points. 
2. Pleasantness of Memory related to the 
affective tone of the events described in the memory, as 
stated by the subject and as determined by the rater. 
The rater was instructed to score on the basis of how an 
"objective observer" might have construed the experience 
described, ignoring how the subject felt about it. The 
affective tone was scored on a 3-point scale of pleasant 
(high score) , neutral or mixed, and unpleasant (low 
score) . 
four 
3. The Object Relations categories consisted of 
3-point scales: "View of Self", "View of 
Environment", "Individual Distinctiveness", and 
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"Interpersonal Contact"; and one scale, "View of 
Others", which had 4-points. The scale point meanings 
tend to be set such that a score of 3 denoted a very 
positive or enhanced perception of the variable in 
question, a score of 2 was mixed or moderate, and a 
score of 1 was more purely negative or, the case of 
distinctiveness and interpersonal contact, unembellished 
and isolative. The "View of Others" scale differed in 
that it contained a score (the lowest of the four) for 
others not present or very peripheral to the memory 
event as well as others perceived as satisfying, mixed, 
or frustrating. As noted in the hypotheses, the five 
specific aspects of object relations were then summed 
("Total") and grouped into "Levels". 
4. Givingness. Scores of O were coded if the 
early memory did not contain themes related to 
dependency, receiving or being deprived of care, etc. 
If such themes were present, scores of +1 indicated 
positive interactions in this regard and scores of -1 
were assigned for poor dependency relations. If events 
were mixed or complex, multiple scores could be coded so 
that a total givingness score could range from +2 to -2 
(5-points). 
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5 . Mastery. If the memory in question did not 
contain a theme denoting an instrumental relationship 
between the subject and the environment, a score of O 
was assigned. If this theme was present, the event was 
scored on three dimensions: "activity" (whether the 
behavior was self-initiated or encouraged), "attitude" 
(whether the behavior was cooperative or resistant and 
hostile), and "outcome" (leading to success/ 
satisfaction or f~ilure). These dimensions were scored 
separately so that the respondent's total mastery score 
could range from -2 to +3 (6-points). 
6. Mutuality was also scored on a 6-point range 
from -2 to +3. If themes related to sibling or peer 
relationships were present in a memory, they were 
assessed according to how positive and cooperative the 
interactions were as well as how actively involved or 
engaged the subject was. 
7. Damage. A score of O was assigned if the 
dimension in question was not contained in the memory, 
that is, if there were no other people, no animals, no 
inanimate objects. A score of 1 was assigned if those 
entities were present and healthy or unharmed. Higher 
scale points were coded depending on degree of damage, 
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from minor injury or illness to death or total 
destruction. Also scored on this scale was emotional 
harm (fear, anxiety, upset) experienced by self and 
other characters in the memory. Scales for each 
dimension were on a 6-point range (O to 5). 
8. Relation to Reality. This variable addressed 
the degree to which events described in the memory were 
believable, logical, and coherent. A 3-point scale was 
used such that a score of 1 represented the most 
illogical and unbelievable and a score of 3 was coded 
for memories that were entirely clear, connected and 
believable 
Trained judges, who were blind with respect to 
the results of the af feet measures, scored the EMQ' s 
independently after achieving sufficient inter-rater 
agreement on pilot data. (Kappa coefficients obtained 
had a median of .81 for individual early memory 
variables, and a range of .53 to 1.00, see Appendix E.) 
Twenty-nine percent (n=30) of the memories were later 
randomly sampled for a check on the stability of inter-
rater agreement. It was found that rates of agreement 
for the study sample remained consistent with those of 
pilot data (range of .52 to 1.00). Furthermore, this 
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30% sub-sample was conferenced to achieve 100% agreement 
on each memory variable rating. 
The mood measures were scored according to manual 
instructions, including calculations of T scores for 
each raw factor score obtained using college student 
norms. The only exception to common scoring practices 
was that for the MAACL-R, the "sensation seeking" 
dimension was not utilized as its meaning as an 
affective variable was unclear. 
RESULTS 
The first question this investigation addressed 
was whether mood changes occurred between administra-
tions one and two. The data were analyzed to assess 
degree of overall temporal stability for all mood 
variables. Both Pearson correlation coefficients, (see 
Table 1), and paired, two-tailed t tests were generated 
for this purpose. There appeared to be a moderate 
degree of variation in mood across testings. Test-
retest correlations ranged from .16 to . 52, al though 
highly significant, indicating at least 73% of the 
variance in the second affect scores was unrelated to 
the first test scores. 
Tests of significance which compared the mean 
differences between scores for each of the different 
mood factors showed no significant differences between 
the two administrations. However, no significant 
differences were expected since no experimental 
manipulation took place that would tend to change the 
subjects' moods in one particular direction. Since 
subjects' mood state changes would be expected to occur, 
by chance, in different directions and in some cases not 
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TABLE 1 
TEMPORAL STABILITY (RETEST RELIABILITIES) 
OF STATE AND TRAIT MOODS 
Pearson Correlation Coefficients 
State Mood Trait Mood 
tension- .44*** anxiety 
anxiety 
depression- .. 45*** depression 
dejection 
anger- .16 ( n. s.) hostility 
hostility 
fatigue- .52**** 
inertia 
confusion- .49**** 
bewilderment 
total mood .45*** dysphoria 
disturbance 
vigor- .43*** positive 
activity affect 
* J2. < .05 
** J2. < .01 : ' \".._ 
*** J2. < .005 
•/ 
**** J2. < .001 // 
/. 
I 
I 
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.41*** 
.27* 
.35* 
.38** 
.36* 
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at all, the means should be about equal, as was found. 
These data indicated that enough mood variance 
occurred to justify subsequent explorations of the 
relationship between mood and memory change. Follow up 
analyses investigating these relationships excluded 
subjects whose mood scores did not differ at all from 
test one to test two on the particular affect factor in 
question. The number of these excluded individuals 
tended to be small, ranging from O to 6 subjects (0 to 
11. 5% of the sample) for the 7 "state mood" variables 
used in this study. The mean percentage of subjects 
with a O difference score on any state mood factor was 
7.14% (or 3.7 subjects). 
As would be expected, a greater number of 
subjects showed no mood differences on the MAACL-R 
factors. Since this instrument was designed to measure 
trait affect, this trend is appropriate. Follow up 
analyses excluded a greater number of subjects than was 
necessary for the POMS analyses since more subjects 
demonstrated no trait mood differences across testings: 
9 to 20 subjects (17.3 to 38.5%) with a mean of 11.8 or 
22.68%. 
On the other hand, it is also important to 
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observe the results obtained when mood stability fig~res 
for both affective measures were specifically compared 
to norms provided in the POMS and MAACL-R manuals. This 
preliminary comparison was made so that the typicality 
of this sample might be ascertained with regard to 
degree of mood variation for an eight to twelve week 
period. These mood factor test-retest reliability 
coefficients as presented in Table 1 reveal some 
counter-intuitive findings. That is, test-retest 
reliability for the MAACL-R factors was, overall, much 
lower for 
(Zuckerman 
this sample than is reported in 
and Lubin, 1967). The range 
the manual 
of MAACL-R 
reliability coefficients for this study was .27 to .41 
with a mean of ~ =.35, whereas their figures are .39 to 
. 64 with a mean of ~ =. 56. In fact, the correlations 
for the MAACL-R trait mood were lower than those for the 
POMS state mood variables. 
Because of the peculiar findings with regard to 
the stability of POMS and MAACL-R scores, another check 
on mood effects was made by pairing similar POMS and 
MAACL-R factors for both survey administrations via two-
tailed Pearson correlation analyses (see Table 2). This 
table indicates to what extent state mood correlated 
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TABLE 2 
CORRELATIONS OF SIMILAR POMS AND MAACL-R MOODS 
Variable 
State: tension 
and 
Trait: anxiety 
State: depression 
and 
Trait: depression 
State: anger 
and 
Trait: hostility 
State: 
total mood disturbance 
and 
Trait: dysphoria 
State: vigor 
and 
Trait: positive affect 
* 12. < • 05 
*** 12. < .005 
* * * * 12. < • 001 
Test 1 
!'.. 
.57**** 
.60**** 
.47**** 
.65**** 
.30* 
Test 2 
;:_ 
.53**** 
.60**** 
.43*** 
.55**** 
.48**** 
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with subjects' reports of how they generally feel. 
Highly significant correlations are generally apparent, 
with a range from . 30 to . 65, and a mean of ;:_ =. 52. 
While a moderate degree of overlap would be reasonably 
expected, these high correlations also suggest that 
subjects' perceptions of typical moods might very well 
be tainted by the mood they are experiencing at present. 
This is particularly possible since the POMS/MAACL-R 
coefficients in Table 2 are much higher on the average 
than MAACL-R reliability coefficients shown in the 
right-hand column of Table 1. 
The second basic question examined was whether 
there were changes in earliest memories over the sampled 
time period. The stability of memory was ascertained by 
calculating both Pearson product-moment correlation 
coefficients and paired t tests for each memory variable 
over time. These findings are presented in Tables 3 and 
4. Table 3 indicates many moderately strong 
correlations between test administrations, with a range 
of .18 to .69 and a mean of ;:_ =.48. Ten of the 17 early 
beyond the . 001 memory indices were correlated 
probability level. Only two variables were not 
correlated: givingness and damage to animals. 
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TEMPORAL STABILITY (RETEST RELIABILITIES) 
OF EARLY MEMORY VARIABLES 
Variable 
Pleasantness of Content 
by Subject 
by Rater 
Object Relations 
View of Others 
View of Self 
View of Environment 
Individual Distinctiveness 
Interpersonal Contact 
Total Score 
Level 
Givingness 
Mastery 
Mutuality 
Damage 
to Self 
to Others 
to Animals 
to Objects 
Relation to Reality 
* :Q. < . 05 
** :Q. < .01 
*** :Q. < .005 
**** :Q. < • 001 
r 
.53**** 
.49**** 
.48**** 
.69**** 
.41*** 
.38** 
.52**** 
.61**** 
.44*** 
.23 
.58**** 
.56**** 
.60**** 
.33* 
.18 
.33* 
.56**** 
TABLE 4 
TESTS OF SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES 
IN EARLY MEMORY VARIABLES 
FROM TEST ONE TO TEST TWO 
Variable 
Pleasantness of Content 
by Subject 
by Rater 
Object Relations 
View of Others 
View of Self 
View of Environment 
Individual Distinctiveness 
Interpersonal Contact 
Total Score 
Level 
Givingness 
·Mastery 
Mutuality 
Damage 
to Self 
to Others 
to Animals 
to Objects 
Relation to Reality 
* l2. < • 05 
t value 
0.68 
0.35 
-1. 03 
-1.00 
-0.96 
-0.81 
-0.23 
-1.64 
-2.24* 
-1.75 
0.00 
0.78 
0.52 
o.oo 
-0.37 
0.96 
0.63 
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Similarly, t tests demonstrated only one 
significant difference, for Object Relations Level (~ = 
-2.24, ~ < .05), in early memory variables across 
testings. Other t scores tended to be quite small (0.00 
to -1.75) and, therefore, indicative of only minor 
variance between administration one to two. 
These two analyses demonstrated that there was 
instability in early memories. The range of 
correlations between the two administrations reveals at 
least 63% of the variance in the second memory scores 
was unrelated to initial memory score values, suggesting 
that further analyses of early memory changes 
would be justified. 
It is worth noting that another index related to 
early memory change was highly suggestive of a great 
deal of overall memory variability for this sample. 
That is, 20 of the 52 subjects (38.46%) reported a 
completely different event for their earliest memory at 
retest. This kind of difference in early memory content 
was calculated into "Total Change" effects in follow up 
analyses and weighted as compared to other more specific 
aspects of memory change. 
Since the proportion of subjects who reported an 
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entirely different earliest memory was relatively large, 
two additional analyses were undertaken in order to 
understand this effect. First, Pearson correlations 
were calculated pairing this "memory change" variable 
and degree of mood difference for each of the various 
mood factors. No significant results were obtained 
among these relationships. However, it should be noted 
that memory change is a highly restricted variable in 
this poi.nt-biserial analysis ( 2 points: O for "same 
event given" and 1 for "different event") with very 
little power to capture such an effect if it does exist. 
Second, this phenomenon was explored by comparing 
subjects who reported the same memory event and those 
who reported a different event by the degree of mood 
shifts they experienced from Test One to Test Two. 
Grouped t tests revealed no significant differences 
between the two groups on amount of mood change, 
including their reports of all state and trait mood 
factors. 
With these preliminary analyses taken into 
account, the nine specific hypotheses and their sub-
groupings were examined. For 
possibility of memory changes 
each hypothesis, the 
covarying with mood 
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changes was explored by running Pearson product-moment 
correlations between mood difference scores and memory 
difference scores. In other words, a distribution of 
difference scores for each mood factor and each memory 
variable was first computed. These difference scores 
became the variables of investigation for the subsequent 
statistical analyses. 
In order to complete these analyses, for each 
mood explored, subjects were separated into two groups: 
those whose mood worsened, becoming more negative or 
less positive at the retest (Group 1), and those whose 
moods improved at the second administration (Group 2). 
As explained above, subjects whose reported mood did not 
change at all for the state or trait mood variable in 
question were excluded from this analysis. 
sets of analyses were examined: 
Thus four 
1. state mood differences by early memory differences 
for group 1 (people feeling worse at retest) 
2. state mood differences by early memory differences 
for group 2 (people feeling better at retest) 
3. trait mood differences by early memory differences 
for grou~ 1 (feeling worse at retest) 
4. trait mood differences by early memory differences 
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for group 2 (feeling better at retest). 
For the sake of facilitating clarity in interpretation, 
the results of these analyses are presented in 5 tables 
rather than four: Tables 5 through 9. Table g, the 
additional table, was developed to look at positive mood 
effects separately. 
In order to understand the results presented in 
these tables it is helpful to be reminded of the 
meanings of early memory scores as explained in the 
procedure section. For al 1 variables except damage, 
higher scores denote better, more positive outlooks 
while lower scores signify perceptions that are more 
negative. For the four damage variables, the meanings 
are reversed, with higher scores indicating greater 
damage and, thus, being construed as more negative. In 
addition, as the total change index is not calculated by 
direction of shifts but by summing the changes on all 
early memory variables, it was expected to correlate 
positively with all mood changes in general, be they 
positive or negative. 
Subsequently, according to the hypotheses, for 
both groups 1 and 2, negative correlations were expected 
for all of the early memory variables except damage when 
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CORRELATIONS OF MEMORY CHANGES BY MOOD CHANGES 
FOR GROUP l (MOOD WORSE AT RETEST) 
Negative State Moods 
Tension Depre Anger Fatigue Confusion 
Memory Variables 
TMD 
Total Change .35* .41* .16 .22 .16 .58*** 
Pleasantness 
by Subject -.13 -.12 -.24 -.26 -.35 -.27 
by Rater .03 -.15 .03 .2 .22 .01 
Object Relations 
Others .06 .12 .06 -.08 .07 .13 
Self .04 -.05 .02 .15 .54** .14 
Environment -.07 -.04 .14 -.02 -. 20 -.11 
Distinctiveness -.07 .17 .15 .22 .17 .31 
Contact -.06 -.03 .28 .11 .25 .14 
Total .02 .11 .27 .13 .30 .26 
Level -.02 .04 .23 -.07 .oo .14 
Givingness .01 -.17 .19 .08 .17 .02 
Mastery -.01 -.14 -.34 -.13 -.14 .08 
Mutuality -.09 -.18 -.32 -.03 .16 .07 
Damage 
Self -.12 .07 -.11 .06 .32 .13 " 
Others -.32 -.18 -.13 -.22 -.33 -.23 
Animals -.03 .22 .28 -.17 .36* 
Objects -.06 .02 .11 -.21 .09 .29 
Relation to -.oo .01 .12 -.01 .13 -.05 
Reality 
Note: The 2 values are one-tailed. 
De pre = Depression 
TMD = Total Mood Disturbance 
* 2 < .05 
** 2 < .01 
*** 2 < .005 
**** 2 < .001 
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coupled with negative state and trait moods (Tables 5 
through 8). For all of those variables, except damage, 
paired with EOSi tive moods, positive correlations were 
expected (Table 9) • Again, for damage the expected 
trends are reversed: positive correlations with negative 
moods, and negative correlations under positive mood 
conditions. 
Table 5 reflects Group 1 correlations (mood worse 
at retest) for negative state moods. Three significant 
correlations were found, with two in the predicted 
directions. For instance, three out of six coefficients 
relating to total amount of memory change showed a 
meaningful covariance with state mood, that is, amount 
of change in tension, depression and general mood 
disturbance ( r_' s =. 35, . 41, 
.005, respectively). 
relationships were found. 
l2. < • 05, and r_ =. 58, l2. < 
In addition, two other 
"View of Self" scores, 
counter to expectations, related positively to confusion 
(r_ =.54, l2. < .01) meaning that the subjects' increased 
feelings of confusion correlated with better views of 
themselves in their memories. Finally, total mood 
disturbance scores were significantly related to "Damage 
to Animals'' (r_ =.36, l2. < .05). This figure demonstrates 
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that greater overall negative mood (or perhaps less 
positive state mood to offset it) was associated with 
greater damage to animals being reported in the early 
recollections for this group. 
Table 6 indicates several associations in the 
predicted direction, although, most mood and memory 
relationships did not differ significantly from zero. 
These figures are for Group 2, subjects whose mood 
improved at retest with regard to the given mood state. 
The majority of the significant relationships found 
between mood and ear 1 y memory change had to do with 
object relations. "View of Others 11 covaried 
significantly with mood on four of the five POMS 
factors. "View of Self" was related to decreases in 
tension, confusion, and total mood disturbance (£ < 
. 05) . "Interpersonal Contact" also revealed a 
significant negative relationship to confusion (~ =-.38, 
£ < • 05) , meaning that as confusion scores decreased, 
early memory descriptions of interactions with others 
were enhanced. "Total" object relations score and its 
associated "Level" also showed significant relationships 
to anger and confusion. That is, as anger and confusion 
scores decreased, object relations measures increased. 
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CORRELATIONS OF MEMORY CHANGES BY MOOD CHANGES 
FOR GROUP 2 {MOOD BETTER AT RETEST} 
Negative State Moods 
Tension Depre Anger Fatigue Confusion TMD 
Memory Variables 
Total Change .01 -.10 -.13 .17 -.09 .07 
Pleasantness 
by Subject -.02 -.11 -.01 -.27 .03 -.13 
by Rater .07 -.15 .10 -.39* .01 -.14 
Object Relations 
Others -.40* -.41* -.45* .29 -.68**** -.38* 
Self -.43* -.28 -.20 .27 -.34* -.38* 
Environment .19 -.09 -.08 -.33 -.13 -.06 
Distinctiveness -.14 .27 -.03 .06 -.11 .31 
Contact -.02 -.17 -.27 -.09 -.38* -.11 
Total -.30 -.30 -.39* .08 -.61*** -.26 
Level -.32 -.27 -.42* -.14 -.53*** -.20 
Givingness .22 -.07 .02 .12 -.22 .10 
Mastery .06 -.17 -.30 -.25 .10 .22 
Mutuality .09 .07 -.25 .11 -.14 .05 
Damage 
# Self -.30 .02 -. 20 .35 .oo .00 
Others -.04 .23 -.06 .27 -.22 .06 
Animals -.09 -.02 -.26 -.16 -.27 -.26 
Objects .20 .32 .20 .50* .12 .36* 
Relation to -.24 -.41* -.21 .oo -.35* -.28 
Reality 
Note: The J2. values are one-tailed. 
De pre = Depression 
TMD = Total Mood Disturbance 
* J2. < .05 
*** J2. < .005 
**** J2. < .001 
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Taken together, these results indicate that for subjects 
whose moods improved at retest, mood congruence effects 
in the area of object relations were particularly 
evident. 
Other predicted relationships for this group 
occurred for fatigue with "Pleasantness by Rater", for 
fatigue and total mood disturbance with "Damage to 
Objects", 
"Relation 
and for depression and confusion with 
to Reality". Therefore, 18 of the 
hypothesized relationships were demonstrated for 
negative mood states and memory among subjects who were 
feeling better at retest. All significant results for 
this group were in accordance with predictions. The 
findings in this table seem to indicate a strong mood 
congruence effect for people whose moods improved. 
Table 7 focuses on Group 1, those whose moods 
were more negative at the retest, but this time looks at 
dysphoric "trait" moods. For this group there are only 
a few significant effects, but all are in the predicted 
direction. For instance, "Total Change" is positively 
related to anxiety (~ =.38, £ < .05), meaning that the 
more this group changed in their ratings of how anxious 
they generally are, the more their early memories 
TABLE 7 49 
CORRELATIONS OF MEMORY CHANGES BY MOOD CHANGES 
FOR GROUP 1, REPORTED TRAIT MOOD WORSE AT RETEST 
Memory Variables 
Total Change 
Pleasantness 
by Subject 
by Rater 
Object Relations 
Others 
Self 
Environment 
Distinctiveness 
Contact 
Total 
Level 
Givingness 
Mastery 
Mutuality 
Damage 
Self 
Others 
Animals 
Objects 
Relation to 
Reality 
Negative Trait Moods 
Anxiety Depression Hostility Dysphoria 
.38* 
-.14 
-.17 
-.08 
.01 
-.06 
.08 
.05 
-.01 
-.08 
-.04 
-.05 
-.08 
.08 
-.01 
.22 
.35* 
- .14 
.40 
-.12 
-.66* 
.02 
-.33 
-.22 
-.08 
.10 
- .18 
-.09 
-.33 
.14 
.28 
-.20 
.14 
.12 
.00 
.31 
.13 
-.43* 
-.08 
.17 
-.03 
.19 
-.03 
- .14 
-.oo 
-.17 
-.08 
-.05 
-.11 
-.17 
.19 
-.30 
.33 
.03 
-.26 
.05 
-.15 
-.04 
.09 
.05 
.02 
.oo 
-.22 
.01 
- .13 
.06 
-.02 
-.02 
.17 
.10 
Note: The ~values are one-tailed. 
* ~ < • 05 
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changed. "Pleasantness by Rater" showed a significant 
correlation with reported trait depression (~ =-.66, ~ < 
.05), indicating that the more depressed subjects 
reported themselves as usually feeling, the more 
unpleasant raters construed their early recollections. 
In addition, the object relations variable "View of 
Others" was significantly correlated with trait 
hostility, (~ =-.43, ~ < .05), as predicted, while 
"Damage to Objects" covaried significantly with trait 
reported anxiety (~ =.35, ~ < .05). 
The last of the tables concerning negative 
affective states is Table 8, Group 2 in terms of "trait 
moods". Just as this group of subjects feeling better 
at Test Two showed more mood congruence effects on the 
POMS, they also show a greater number and more potent 
effects on the MAACL-R measures. Most of these 
significant relationships occurred among the object 
relations variables. There are 15 such predicted 
covariations in all, nine of which are significant 
beyond the . 005 probability level. Moreover, "Object 
Relations Total" and "Levels" were significantly related 
to all four of the negative trait moods presented. 
These findings constitute strong evidence that as 
TABLE 8 51 
CORRELATIONS OF MEMORY CHANGES BY MOOD CHANGES 
FOR GROUP 2, REPORTED TRAIT MOOD BETTER AT RETEST 
Memory Variables 
Total Change 
Pleasantness 
by Subject 
by Rater 
Object Relations 
Others 
Self 
Environment 
Distinctiveness 
Contact 
Total 
Level 
Givingness 
Master_y 
Mutuality 
Damage 
Self 
Others 
Animals 
Objects 
Relation to 
Reality 
Ne~ative Trait Moods 
Anxiety Depression Hostility Dysphoria 
- .17 
.06 
.23 
-.72**** 
-.53* 
.02 
-.21 
-.19 
-.51* 
-.55** 
.26 
-.03 
.02 
-.10 
-.22 
-.18 
-.07 
-.66*** 
- .17 
-.10 
- .10 
-.38* 
-.34 
-.23 
-.30 
-.23 
-.63*** 
-.59*** 
-.13 
.14 
.10 
.11 
-.27 
.12 
.08 
-.45* 
-.03 
-.02 
.09 
-.31 
-.70**** 
-.02 
-.48* 
-.27 
-.64*** 
-.61*** 
.08 
-.04 
-.14 
-.06 
-.39* 
.18 
- .19 
-.56** 
- .19 
-.11 
-.08 
-.50** 
-.56*** 
-.10 
-.27 
-.27 
-.62*** 
-.55*** 
.26 
-.08 
-.21 
-.19 
-.33 
-.15 
.09 
-.60*** 
Note: The ~values are one-tailed. 
* ~ < .05 
** ~ < .01 
*** ~ < .005 
**** ~ < .001 
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people's typical feelings improve, their cogniti~e­
affective schemata regarding self and others 
shows a clearer relationship to their change in moods. 
Also noteworthy on Table 8 are the significant 
correlations of "Relation to Reality" to each of the 
four negative trait moods used in this study. These 
data signify that, particularly for "mood improvers", 
dysphoric moods and logical, coherent early memory 
presentations are negatively related. Finally, one 
correlation of hostility with "Damage to Objects" (r =-
.39, 12. < .05) ran counter to predictions. That is, 
greater hostility was related to less reported damage 
for this group. 
Table 9 summarizes data on all positive moods 
addressed by this study, both state and trait measures 
for Groups 1 and 2. Only a few significant correlations 
are apparent, and only for Group 2. This completes the 
pattern of greater mood congruence effects occurring 
with people's whose moods improved across testings. 
Similar to trends discussed previously, most of these 
effects are found under the object relations variables: 
"View of Others, Self", and "Interpersonal Contact". 
All of these significant relationships were in the 
TABLE 9 53 
CORRELATIONS OF MEMORY CHANGES BY MOOD CHANGES 
FOR BOTH GROUPS, POSITIVE STATE AND TRAIT MOODS 
Memory: Variables 
Total Change 
Pleasantness 
by Subject 
by Rater 
Object Relations 
Others 
Self 
Environment 
Distinctiveness 
Contact 
Total 
Level 
Givingness 
Mastery 
~utuality: 
Damage 
Self 
Others 
Animals 
Objects 
Relation to 
Realit:;i 
Note: The E.. values 
* E.. < .05 
** E.. < .01 
State Mood 
Vigor 
Group 1 
(worse) 
-.27 
.23 
.01 
-.08 
.06 
-.06 
.07 
-.07 
-.05 
.11 
-.19 
.15 
-.04 
-.12 
-.00 
-.11 
-.09 
.13 
Group 2 
(better) 
-.15 
-.14 
-.23 
.41* 
-.25 
-.29 
.01 
.24 
.04 
.07 
-.22 
-.06 
.08 
.49* 
.22 
.29 
.26 
-.35 
are one-tailed. 
Trait Mood 
Positive Affect 
Group 1 
(worse) 
-.30 
-.21 
.27 
.21 
-.09 
-.17 
.11 
.24 
.08 
.15 
-.19 
-.02 
-.04 
-.02 
-.04 
-.02 
-.06 
Group 2 
(better) 
.25 
-.08 
-.08 
.18 
.45** 
-.23 
- .10 
.33* 
.21 
.24 
-.05 
-.06 
.25 
.19 
.12 
.06 
.13 
.47** 
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predicted directions, with more positive outlooks 
corresponding to mood changes in a positive direction. 
Two other significant correlations appear on this 
table. "Relation to Reality" shows a strong positive 
co-occurrence with positive trait affect (~ =.47, E. < 
. 01), again for the group feeling better at retest. 
This statistic demonstrates that increases in positive 
trait affect are related to more logical, coherent 
memory descripti~ns, similar to when the previously 
noted decrease in negative mood states takes place. 
"Damage to Self" correlated significantly with 
vigor (state mood), but in the opposite direction 
expected (~ =.49, E. < .05). That is, as positive mood 
increased for this group, so did the amount of damage 
they attributed to themselves in their early memories. 
This is the second counter-intuitive finding for degree 
of damage that has appeared in these analyses, both 
occurring for the group feeling better at Test Two and 
both in connection with trait rather than state mood 
changes. 
In summary, the first hypothesis presented in the 
introduction was supported by the data. Early memory 
change was related to mood state change for a number of 
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variables examined. The total amount of early mem~ry 
change {Hypothesis Two) covaried significantly with 
increases in negative state mood. No relationship was 
found for moods that became more positive. Therefore, 
the second hypothesis was partially supported. 
The third hypothesis, that pleasantness of memory 
content would correlate with mood shifts, was not 
supported. Two of the 48 relationships examined 
demonstrated significant covariance. Less fatigue at 
administration two was related to more pleasant memories 
as judged by raters. Reports of increased trait 
depression were related to early memories becoming less 
pleasant as perceived by raters. 
The fourth hypothesis was that object relations 
variables would change in relationship to mood. This 
hypothesis was supported to a great extent. View of 
Others, Self, Object Relations Total, and Level showed 
many significant relationships to mood change in the 
predicted direction. The significant correlations 
occurred primarily for subjects whose moods improved at 
retest. 
The fifth through seventh hypotheses predicted 
that mood shifts would correlate with changes in the 
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thematic variables, Givingness, Mastery, and Mutuali.ty. 
These hypotheses were not supported. No significant 
relationships were found for any of the mood factors 
examined. 
The eighth hypothesis stated that descriptions of 
physical and emotional damage would covary with changes 
in mood. Six significant relationships were revealed, 
one opposite of what was predicted. These relationships 
demonstrated no particular pattern in that they occurred 
for both groups on a variety of state and trait mood 
factors. 
The ninth hypothesis was that changes in the 
degree of clarity and logic with which early memories 
were presented (Relation to Reality) would be related to 
mood shifts. This hypothesis was supported for subjects 
whose mood improved at the second administration on 7 of 
the 14 mood factors investigated. 
DISCUSSION 
The results presented provide impressive evidence 
regarding early memory change. The data illustrate that 
a relationship exists between naturally-occurring mood 
and earliest childhood recollections. The temporal 
stability of earliest memories was discovered to be 
lower than expected by clinical models. Much of the 
variance that occurred for the memories was associated 
with changes in 
particularly for 
direction. 
naturally-occurring mood states, 
affective shifts in a positive 
The first and most general of the hypotheses 
addressed by this study was that changes in early 
memories would correlate with changes in mood, such that 
mood elevations would be related to more positive 
descriptions, perceptions, and attributions in memories, 
and mood changes in a negative direction would 
correspond to poorer, more pessimistic early memory 
attributions. 
This overriding hypothesis was supported by the 
data on several important early recollection variables. 
Some remarkably strong relationships emerged in the 
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structural aspects of early memories, (i.e., object 
relations), especially for subjects whose mood improved 
at retest. Other areas such as thematic content showed 
no significant mood congruence effects. These 
discoveries have important implications for the debate 
about the stability as well as the significance of early 
memories. The findings seem to lend qualified support 
to both schools of thought about the stability of early 
memories. 
First, the general stability of thematic content, 
independent of the influence of mood, supports Adlerian 
notions about early memories. The fact that basic 
themes tend to persist provides evidence to support 
Adler's claim that the content of early recollections is 
related to central and highly stable core issues for the 
individual (1937). Such basic struggles would be 
expected to last for many years if not across the entire 
life span. This thematic stability also suggests that 
Bruhn's tenet (1984) that early memory themes are 
indicative of blocked goals or "unfinished business" may 
have validity. 
On the other hand, the notion of thematic 
stability in early memories requires qualification. In 
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this investigation, the theme of "givingness" was found 
to have a lower (and non-significant} test-retest 
correlation than other themes explored. However, this 
may be due to the manner in which this theme was 
conceptualized and scored. More so than the others, it 
would appear to be related to and influenced by 
structural or object relations components of memory in 
that it is very interpersonally oriented. "Givingness" 
was specifically conceptualized to address issues 
related to nurturance from caregivers and is, therefore, 
similar to the need satisfaction and frustration 
criteria used to rate "View of Others". 
In addition, all three themes showed some 
variation across testings, al though the variation was 
not related to mood shifts. This leaves open the 
question as to what factors account for thematic 
variability in early memories, a question that can not 
be answered here. 
The second hypothesis under investigation was 
related to degree of early memory change. It was 
thought that individuals whose early memories changed on 
a greater number of variables, particularly if they 
narrated a different memory event altogether, would have 
experienced a correlative change 
hypothesis was partially supported. 
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in mood. This 
Interestingly, the 
expected ef feet was found for individuals whose mood 
became more tense (state) , anxious (trait) , depressed 
(state), and generally more dysphoric (state) at Test 
Two. Those whose mood improved did not demonstrate an 
associated degree of overall memory change, al though 
they did shift remarkably in certain specific respects, 
namely object relations and relation to reality. 
This phenomenon that increases in negative mood 
were associated with greater total memory change is in 
sharp contrast to the pattern found for most of the 
early memory variables when analyzed separately, namely 
that stronger and more numerous effects were found for 
people who experienced a mood elevation between 
testings. This discrepancy in the results indicates 
that effects for dysphoric moods were less pronounced 
with regard to specific qualitative aspects of early 
memories, but were present nonetheless. It seems that 
the effects of negative affective shifts upon the 
recollection of early childhood events were less direct 
and less clearly a relationship of congruence between 
mood and memory. The influence of certain increasingly 
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negative mood states is subtle but equally pervasive and 
meaningful in that these states correspond to less early 
memory stability overall. 
Although this latter finding on total memory 
change was demonstrated for descending mood only, it is 
generally supportive of mood congruence theories in that 
some association or link between memory and mood is 
implied. It may indicate dichotomous memory retrieval 
processes for more negative in contrast to more positive 
mood shift directions. Regardless of the explanation, 
however, it has been demonstrated that diffuse memory 
changes are related to negative mood swings. This 
finding has useful clinical implications in terms of 
what to expect in childhood-focused forms of therapy 
from clients who become more depressed or tense for a 
period of time. However, it should be recognized that 
the factors in operation for this effect of "total 
memory change" are not clearly understood from this 
investigation and warrant more exploration. 
The third hypothesis under consideration had to 
do with the pleasantness or unpleasantness of early 
memory contents in relationship to mood changes. For 
the most part, no relationship was found between the 
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two, meaning that overall affective attributions (by 
subjects) or impressions (by raters) did not necessarily 
directly correspond to positive or negative shifts in 
people's moods. The exception to this finding, however, 
was that rater judgments did covary with mood shifts in 
two instances: for subjects whose mood had improved at 
the retest, an effect was found for state fatigue, and 
for subjects whose mood had become more negative at 
administration two, a relationship occurred for trait 
depression. Obviously, there does not appear to be a 
clear pattern for these results other than the fact that 
both moods showing a significant covariation with memory 
were negative. Further research would be needed to 
explain these anomalies. 
Object relations variables (hypotheses 4a through 
4g) showed the strongest and most frequent expected 
effects. While perceptions about safety and support in 
the environment were not related to any mood factors, 
and the distinctiveness with which others were described 
was significantly related to only one mood variable 
(trait hostility), the quality of other structural 
variables covaried with mood shifts as predicted in many 
instances. 
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On the other hand, one relationship f9und 
contradicted the hypotheses; that is, "View of self" 
improved with increased feelings of confusion. It is 
not clear why this particular relationship would run 
counter to so many other object relations trends 
revealed in this study. It could be that since 
confusion is actually more of a cognitive state that an 
affective condition the relationship to early memory is 
more complex. For instance, perhaps subjects presented 
themselves more positively when experiencing greater 
confusion as a defense against damage to self-esteem or 
increased dysphoria. However, no conclusion about this 
effect can be reached at this time. 
There was a marked correspondence between mood 
and object relations variables in many respects. The 
congruence effect was experienced primarily by people 
whose moods had shifted in a positive direction upon 
retest. The stronger effect for positive changes in 
mood implies that a "rose-colored glasses" sort of 
process may be taking place. That is, as people's moods 
become more positive, there is a tendency for these mood 
changes to influence their attributions with respect to 
early memories. This does not mean that the general 
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feelings associated with their early memories are 
entirely positive, however. It indicates, rather, that 
relative to when they are experiencing more negative 
moods, their early memory perceptions are more positive. 
The relativity of this mood congruence effect 
fits in nicely with the concept of a range or continuum 
of object representations or cognitive/affective 
schemata existing for the individual, as proposed 
earlier. An individual's mood change may facilitate a 
shift in perceptions and attributions (or vice versa) 
about self and others somewhere along that person's 
characteristic range of experiencing. For a very 
positive or negative person these shifts may appear only 
as subtle mitigations, still establishing him/her as 
fairly positive or negative compared to other people. 
Again, this would explain why more drastic differences 
in overall mood pleasantness were not found for most 
early memories. 
On the other hand, it should be kept in mind that 
changes in the total score and qualitative level of 
object relations were strongly related to decreases in 
negative mood. This covariation was particularly potent 
and consistent when reported trait moods improved. 
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Moreover, level of object relations was the one e~rly 
memory variable that differed significantly with respect 
to the entire group upon retest. Considering the degree 
of change in perceptions that must occur to move an 
individual from one level rating to another, the 
difference in quality of object relations that occurred 
for many individuals across testings was quite 
remarkable. 
This suggests that such a change would be 
noticeable to a psychotherapist as his/her client was 
recalling childhood memories in treatment. In fact, the 
positive mood shift which corresponds to more positive 
interpersonal perceptions may result in completely 
different memories being retold or focused on in a 
therapy session. Therefore, this kind of mood and 
memory congruence would be useful for clinicians to bear 
in mind when trying to understand their clients' 
contemporary feelings and attitudes as well as the 
clients' view of their childhood. 
With respect to the theoretical debate about the 
processes underlying memory, it should be recognized 
that the mood congruence effect that has emerged for 
structural aspects of early memories is in keeping with 
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the sorts of mood and memory findings that have been 
noted in empirical studies for many years (Blaney, 
1986). Overall, examination of the object relations 
aspect of early memories supports the idea that the 
recall processes in operation are influenced by mood or 
other short-term variables that would tend to cause some 
fluctuation and instability in people's perceptions of 
themselves and others. 
The fifth through seventh hypotheses of this 
study involved the thematic content of early memories. 
As mentioned above, these components of childhood 
recollections appear to be moderately stable. When 
there is change, it does not seem to be related mood 
fluctuation. Further research is needed to identify 
those factors that do covary with thematic change. One 
possibility is that thematic elements of early memory 
are connected with developmental issues such as those 
framed by Erikson (1963), and Mahler (1972a, 1972b, 
1972c). If so, the themes would tend to be more 
persistent than structural aspects of memory, but would 
still show some degree of change with maturation. For 
instance, it is likely that developmental themes related 
to separation and individuation would be present in the 
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early memories of young adults who are of ten 
experiencing conflicts and confusion about independence 
from family. As the resolution of this issue 
progresses, so too would the thematic content of their 
memories tend to shift. 
Another perspective from which to examine the 
relative stability of early memory themes has been 
developed by McAdams (1985, in press). This approach 
emphasizes the generativ~ meaning of memories and 
"nuclear episodes" (1985) to the individual. This life 
span perspective postulates that early memories are not 
only significant to the individual in the metaphorical 
sense that Adler theorized, but that there is a certain 
continuity and coherence to memory. McAdams' 
perspective also takes an Eriksonian approach in 
focusing on identity development. He hypothesizes that 
the individual remembers, organizes, and integrates 
experience toward a "life story". This "personal myth" 
provides "integrity, unity, and purpose", and the on-
going establishment of identity (in press). The life-
story model of identity purposes, therefore, that early 
memory themes can also be investigated in terms of key 
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facets of identity that are developed and constructed 
throughout life. 
In order to investigate these hypotheses about 
thematic elements of early memories, it seems that 
studies which follow subjects over a period of several 
years if not throughout the life span would be helpful. 
It would also be necessary to carefully separate 
structural and thematic variables in the data, since the 
present study suggests that structural aspects of these 
life-stories will be associated with fluctuations in 
mood. 
The eighth hypothesis investigated the 
descriptions of physical and emotional damage or trauma 
in early memories. It was predicted that degree of 
damage attributed to self, other people, animals, and 
inanimate objects would covary with shifts in mood. 
Conclusions regarding mood relationships with 
attributions of trauma are difficult to make at this 
point because results were inconsistent. For the most 
part, relationships between mood and damage were not 
found. Some scattered effects were revealed for 
different kinds of damage, different moods and different 
subject groups, with no clear pattern emerging. In 
fact, two 
predictions, 
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correlations found were contrary to 
both for subjects whose mood had improved 
at the second administration. It seems that mood and 
recall of early illness or trauma were either unrelated 
or covaried as a function of a third or more factors. 
As speculated above, those factors might have to do with 
ego defenses. Another possibility is that sometimes 
mood improvements might exaggerate one's perceptions of 
negative events in the past. Future studies would be 
needed to investigate these possibilities. 
The ninth and final hypothesis under scrutiny 
concerned the manner in which early memories were 
presented, as well as the logic and credulity of their 
contents. It was predicted that changes in mood would 
covary with degree of clarity, coherence, and 
believability in childhood recollections. Again, 
results were mixed such that a relationship was found 
only for subjects whose mood improved at the retest. 
For this group, the effect was fairly consistent except 
with respect to four mood variables, three negative 
state and one positive state affects. Thus, these 
findings seem to indicate that a strong relationship 
exists between mood improvemept and more coherent, 
realistic accounts of memory. 
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This does not mean, 
however, that the opposite phenomenon occurs, that is, 
more dysphoric moods do not necessarily lead to or 
correspond with gross memory distortions or confusion. 
Interestingly, this conclusion concurs with cognitive 
theories of depression and empirical findings that 
depressed mood does not make people less realistic. In 
fact, depressed subjects are of ten shown to be more 
realistic in their perceptions of events than non-
depressed subjects who tend to make slight distortions 
in a positive or self-inflating manner (Lewinsohn, 
Steinmetz, Larson, & Franklin, 1981). 
memory 
general 
In conclusion, the recurring pattern of mood and 
change for early childhood events is one of 
congruence, particularly when mood shifts in a 
positive direction. This pattern is not invariable, but 
is certainly substantial. It applies primarily to the 
structural aspects of early memories, namely object 
relations. Mood congruence for positive affective 
shifts also occurs with respect to the clarity and 
coherence with which a memory is narrated. 
These findings correspond to the results 
generally revealed in experimental research on memory, 
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and in research on the cognitive aspects of depressi?n· 
The differences that emerged in this investigation 
between the effects of positive and negative mood 
changes parallel the differences found in research 
comparing cognitive styles of depressed versus non-
depressed populations (Lewinsohn, et. al., 1981). 
When mood shifts in a negative direction, fewer 
relationships or patterns to the qualitative aspects of 
early memories emerge. However, it seems that as mood 
becomes more dysphoric, a greater degree of overall 
memory variation occurs. This finding lends itself to 
further empirical exploration. It could be that a more 
complex or curvilinear relationship exists between 
negative mood changes and early memories. It is also 
possible that the covariation is actually stronger than 
the one found for this small and relatively homogeneous 
sample. 
Other aspects of early memories do not appear to 
shift in relationship to mood change. The overall 
pleasantness or unpleasantness of memories retrieved is 
not necessarily correlated with changes in mood state. 
Perceptions regarding physical and emotional trauma are 
subject to temporal variation, but the factors that 
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influence the changes are probably complex and, as y~t, 
undetermined. Investigation of this question would be 
another good focus for future studies on early memory. 
Finally, thematic aspects of early memories 
appear to be moderately stable. These results support 
the predominant theories on early memory to which most 
clinicians subscribe. The changes in early memory 
themes that do take place do not covary with mood 
changes, but may be related to other factors such as a 
shift in the salience of developmental issues for the 
individual. Research that examines early memory themes 
over several years and from a life-span developmental 
perspective would be valuable contributions to the body 
of literature on early memories. 
There were a number of limitations to the present 
study that bear attention in light of its potential 
generalizability, as well as recommendations for future 
research on early recollections. The sample size was 
relatively small and homogeneous in age span and level 
of education. Therefore, the population studied was 
narrow and possibly atypical. The degree to which this 
•• 
sample might differ from others in terms of degree of 
mood changes is not clear, but is an important issue for 
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replication. For instance, it is possible that stro~ger 
effects for negative mood shifts were not found because 
of the narrow or atypical nature of a college student 
population with respect to either mood or memory 
plasticity. 
While the results found were surprisingly robust 
given the limits of the sample, it is important to 
recognize that generalizing these results to other 
populations must be done with caution. Future studies 
in this area should focus upon both broader, more 
heterogeneous samples and on specific types of clinical 
populations in order to compare effects. For instance, 
one question worth exploring is whether manic-depressive 
patients might show the same sort of congruence pattern 
as moods shift, or if there is a different mood and 
early memory process at work for this population. 
The findings presented in this study provide 
remarkable evidence for the relationship between changes 
in mood and descriptions of earliest childhood 
recollections. It has been demonstrated that while 
certain aspects of early memories, such as themes, are 
relatively stable, the structural aspects of early 
recollections are less constant and more closely related 
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to contemporary mood states. As af feet changes in. a 
positive direction, memory shifts in object relations 
and clarity of memory presentation are particularly 
evident. When mood changes in a negative direction, 
memory changes also occur, although the affective tones 
of these changes are not necessarily congruent. 
However, replications of this procedure with different 
samples are needed in order to ascertain more 
conclusively the typicality of these findings and their 
appropriate application to the clinical use of earliest 
memories. 
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CODE: 
Early Memory Questionnaire 
Think back to the earliest memory you have of a sRecif ic 
happening or event from your childhood. Please describe 
it below in as much detail as your recollection of the 
event permits. 
Describe an event you actually remember. For instance, 
leave out incidents that someone told you about yourself 
but you yourself don't actually recall. Also, include 
only a specific, one-time event ("I remember one 
time ... ") and not a recurring event ("I always used 
to ... " ) . 
Be sure to include how the memory begins for you and how 
it ends, as well as how you felt about what happened. 
Also, list your approximate age at the time the event 
occurred. 
Early Memory Questionnare 
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Please answer each of the following questions about your 
earliest memory (from the previous page). 
What is the clearest part of the memory? 
What is the strongest feeling in the memory? 
thought or action is this feeling connected with? 
What 
If you could change the memory in any way, how would you 
change it? 
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Summary of the modified Comprehensive Early Memory 
Scoring System (Last & Bruhn, 1985): 
1. Pleasantness of Content: 
rater. 
Judged by subject and 
2. Object Relations: View of Others, View of Self, 
View of Environment, Individual Distinctiveness, 
Interpersonal Contact. 
3. Themes: 
A. Givingness 
1. Gives care to others 
2. Receives care from others 
3. Deprived of care 
4. Deprives others of care 
B. Maste:r_y 
1. Activity 
a. Self-initiated 
b. Encouraged by others 
2. Attitude 
a. Cooperative 
b. Hostile/Defiant/Resistant 
3. Outcome 
a. Successful 
b. Failure 
C. Mutuality 
1. Cooperative with peers 
2. Observing peers at play 
3. Aggressive with peers 
4. Aggressed upon by others 
4. Damage: Self, Others, Animals, Inanimate Objects 
5. Relation to Reality: Degree of clarity, logic and 
credibility associated with the early memory. 
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Inter-rater reliability Kappa coefficients for pilot 
data: 
1. Pleasantness of Content: 
A. Subject 
B. Rater 
2. Object Relations: 
A. View of Others 
B. View Of Self 
C. View of Environment 
D. Individual Distinctiveness 
E. Interpersonal Contact 
F. Level 
3. Themes 
A. Givingness 
1. Gives care to others 
2. Receives care 
3. Deprived of care 
4. Deprives others 
5. Givingness theme present 
B. Master_y 
1. Activity 
2. Attitude 
3. Outcome 
4. Mastery theme present 
C. Mutuality 
1. Cooperative 
2. Observing others 
3. Aggressive 
4. Aggressed upon 
5. Mutuality theme present 
4. Damage 
A. Self 
B. Others 
C. Animals 
D. Inanimate Objects 
5. Relation to Reality 
.92 
.77 
.73 
.92 
.62 
.70 
.70 
.53 
1.00 
.80 
.80 
1.00 
.90 
.77 
.77 
.92 
.90 
.70 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
.70 
.81 
1.00 
1.00 
.70 
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